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Abstract—The NTP network is an important part of the
Internet’s infrastructure, and one of the most challenging times
for the NTP network is around leap seconds. In this paper we look
at the behaviour of public servers in the NTP network in 2005 and
over the period from 2008 to present, focusing on leap seconds.
We review the evolution of the NTP reference implementation
with respect to leap seconds and show how the behaviour of the
network has changed since 2005. Our results show that although
the network’s performance has certain problems, these seem to
be reducing over time.
Index Terms—NTP, Leap Seconds, Internet Measurement
I. INTRODUCTION
THE NTP network provides time synchronisation for muchof the Internet, and also for mobile devices, small cells,
etc. As relatively good clock synchronisation is important for
the correct functioning of many protocols and applications (in-
cluding DNS, certificate verification, filesystems and caching)
the operation of the NTP network is of indirect concern to
essentially all Internet users.
The NTP network consists of NTP servers, which exchange
UDP packets to establish the differences between their local
clocks and then steer their local clocks towards the correct
time. Servers that are directly connected to reference clocks,
which know the correct time from external sources, are said to
be at stratum 1. NTP servers that are synchronised to a server
at stratum 1 are at stratum 2, and so on. In addition to the
basic packets used for clock synchronisation, NTP supports
various packets for management.
One subtle aspect of NTP, as it is usually deployed, is that it
uses UTC as a reference timescale [1]. UTC is a compromise
timescale between atomic time (TAI) and mean solar time,
more precisely UT1. UTC consists of fixed-length SI seconds.
To allow for variation in the rotation of the Earth, UTC allows
minutes with 59 or 61 seconds resulting in leap seconds which
are used keep UTC within 0.9s of UT1. As the rotation of the
Earth is slowing, and the length of the SI second is based on
the rotation of the Earth in approximately 1820 [2], in practice
a minute with an extra second is required roughly every 18
months to keep UTC within 0.9s of UT1. The need for a leap
second is determined by the International Earth Rotation and
Reference Systems Service (IERS) based on measurements of
the rotation of the Earth. Announcements are typically made
six months in advance of a leap second, and leap seconds are
currently scheduled at the end of June or December through
IERS Bulletin C1.
While a jump of one second is unlikely to cause direct
problems for end users, UTC is the legal basis for timekeep-
ing in many countries. On a practical basis, many systems
1http://www.iers.org/SharedDocs/News/EN/BulletinC.html
depend on sub-second synchronisation, for example distributed
systems running in data centres, financial trading systems,
mobile systems handling call handover or playout in protocols
such as RTP. The mis-introduction of leap seconds into such
systems could cause substantial issues. Indeed, during the 2015
leap second, a number of stock exchanges were reported to
suspended operations as a precaution. We outline some of
the issues seen in operational systems in Section VI. The
continued use of leap seconds is under debate at the ITU-R,
and other fora2, with resolution COM5/1 of the 2015 World
Radio Conference calling for further and wider study of the
matter. The original aim of this survey was to characterise
the leap second behaviour of the NTP network, particularly
misbehaviour, in order to provide input to this debate on the
NTP network’s performance.
The NTP network attempts to handle leap seconds grace-
fully by propagating information about pending leap seconds
by using flags in exchanged synchronisation packets. Thus,
for most users the leap second is supposed to be transparently
managed by NTP without intervention. Historically, a limited
number of reference clocks could automatically provide infor-
mation about pending leap seconds into the network, and par-
ticularly conscientious server administrators could manually
introduce the information. However, anecdotal concerns about
missing, misapplied or maliciously manufactured leap seconds
have led to changes in the NTP protocol and configuration
relating to leap seconds. This paper chronicles these changes
and relates them to the observed changes in behaviour of the
NTP network.
In Section II we review work relating to the behaviour of
NTP. In Section III we outline how data was collected for
this survey. In Section IV we discuss what we can learn about
the leap second-related behaviour of the NTP network from
these results. In Section V we discuss how, when a part of
the NTP network incorrectly implements a leap second, it
may be possible to analyse subsequently available data to
identify errant external servers. Finally, we discuss our results
in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of previous surveys of the NTP
network. In 1989 Mills conducted a survey of hosts responding
to the NTP, ICMP and Time protocols [3]. A tool for finding
NTP servers by querying known servers was described [4]. The
authors collected clock statistics and the level of branching of
the NTP-tree in order to assess the pressure on high-stratum
servers. In 1995, another survey identified as many NTP
2Steve Allan has compiled a bibliography on the future of leap seconds at
http://www.ucolick.org/∼sla/leapsecs/onlinebib.html.
2servers as possible by walking the NTP graph [5]. The survey
looked at factors such as the stratum, time/frequency offsets
and the roundtrip delays observed. Followup surveys in 1999
and 2005 [6], [7], again considered factors such as stratum,
offset and number of peers. All these studies considered the
NTP networks at particular points in time while comparing
their results to previous studies.
Other studies have looked at the synchronisation of par-
ticular classes of hosts, such as web servers [8] or desktop
clients [9], tried to identify the sources of poor synchronisation
[10] and shown that NTP is not the only time synchronisation
protocol with leap second issues [11]. More recently, some of
the monitoring features of NTP software have been exploited
to carry out amplification DoS attacks, which has prompted
measurement studies and configuration advice [12], [13]. A
new series of attacks exploiting features of the NTP and
IP protocols were discovered [14]. Clock synchronisation
has been of interest for other reasons, for example clock
characteristics can be used to de-anonimise hosts [15]. In
general, accuracy of timestamps is considered an important
factor in digital forensics [16], [17] and the impact of leap
seconds on timestamps in RTP is considered in RFC 7164.
III. DATA COLLECTION
Most NTP operators do not have servers with reference
clocks directly attached, and so depend on other servers to
provide timing and leap second related information. There are
two main mechanisms used by users and vendors to find NTP
servers. First, the ntp.org website lists Stratum 1 and Stratum
2 NTP servers3 that provide a public NTP service, which can
be used by those configuring their own NTP servers. Second,
challenges around the use of the NTP server lists by vendors
(e.g. [18], [19]) led to the establishment of the NTP pool4
in 2003. The NTP pool is a DNS-based mechanism to locate
NTP servers providing a public service.
In 2005, using the first mechanisms, we identified a list of
stratum 1 and stratum 2 servers by using the lists provided at
ntp.org. Preliminary data was then collected at the 2005 leap
second. Subsequently, the continental NTP pool DNS entries
were queried to identify a subset of the NTP pool servers
available. Long-term data collection began in November 2008
and continues to the present (February 2016 as of writing,
see Fig. 1). The usual query used by NTP admins to find the
leap second status of a server is ntpq -c rv leap. This
query was issued once an hour to each server, the output was
recorded and the value of the leap flags was noted. The queries
were issued from a host on a production DSL network and are
subject to normal connectivity problems, upgrades and other
similar operational issues.
In 2012, the list of NTP servers was updated, adding new
servers that had appeared on the ntp.org server lists and adding
a sample of new hosts from the NTP pool. The amount of data
that had been collected also warranted rewriting the collection
3Servers, locations and access conditions are listed at http://support.ntp.org/
bin/view/Servers/StratumOneTimeServers and http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/
Servers/StratumTwoTimeServers.
4http://www.pool.ntp.org/
Date Change
2005-12 Preliminary measurement.
2008-11 Measurements start.
2009-05 OS upgrade.
2011-11 OS upgrades.
2012-04 Update stratum 1, 2 & pool list.
2012-06 OS upgrade.
2012-06 Rewrite in perl. Update pool list.
2012-09 Inode subdirectory limit reached.
2012-09 OS upgrade.
2013-02 OS upgrade.
2013-02 OS upgrade. Add IPv6 queries. Prune unresponsive.
Update stratum 1, 2 & pool list.
2013-06 Inode subdirectory limit resolved.
Default variable list requested..
2014-01 Add ntpdate queries.
2014-02 Update host list using ntpdate.
2014-03 Update host list using ntpdate.
2014-06 Update host list using ntpdate.
TABLE I
CHANGES TO MEASUREMENT SYSTEM.
system in perl. For a period from September 2012 until June
2013, only the leap second flags are recorded due to an issue
with the directory layout used to store raw results. When this
issue was resolved, the query used was replaced with ntpq
-c rv, which asks the server for the default list of available
variables. In practice, this always includes the leap flags, but
also includes a number of other useful indicators. A number
of other cleanups were performed at this time, including the
removal of long-term unresponsive servers.
In December 2014, the use of NTP as part of an am-
plification DoS attack became widely known. This attack
made use of the monlist administrative command, and
so many NTP administrators began blocking administrative
queries, including the rv command used in this survey. To
counter the declining response rate to requests, in January
2014 servers that no longer responded to the ntpq -c rv
command were identified, and for these servers a simple
time synchronisation query was issued using the ntpdate
command. The response to this command includes the value
of the leap second flags and a number of other pieces of
information, including stratum, precision, refid, etc. The list
of servers responding to ntpdate was updated several times
in 2014. The updates to the system are summarised in Table I.
IV. RESULTS
The preliminary data covered the leap second on Saturday
December 31st 2005, and three leap seconds occurred during
the main measurement period: Wednesday December 31st
2008, Saturday June 30th 2012 and Tuesday June 30th 2015.
There was also the potential for a leap second on 12 other days
(the remaining final days of June and December). In order to
understand the behaviour of the NTP network around these
times, it is useful to understand the network’s propagation
of leap second information, both automatically and through
configuration files.
Since reference clocks providing notification of upcoming
leap seconds are relatively rare, the traditional approach of
ntpd was to believe that a leap second was pending at the end
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Fig. 1. Number of distinct hosts queried and responding with particular attributes. Attributes have been grouped if they always appear together.
of the month if any of the servers it was using for synchronisa-
tion advertised an upcoming leap second. Particularly attentive
NTP server administrators could manually flag an upcoming
leap second using the ntp administrative commands. In 2007,
around fears of bogus (i.e. incorrect) leap seconds propagating
through the NTP network, the rule was modified: now ntpd
considers the advertisement of a leap second valid only if more
than half its peers advertise it. If a more authoritative source
of information is available, such as a manually configured leap
second file or a locally attached reference clock, then ntpd will
use this information.
Support for loading a list of historical and upcoming leap
seconds was originally added to ntpd in 2000 as a side
effect of new cryptographic features being added to ntpd.
These extensions also allowed transfer of the table of leap
seconds through the protocol associated with the cryptographic
features. Anecdotally, deployment of these features beyond
users with high-level security needs was minimal. In 2007,
a feature that permitted the loading of the leap second file
by adding a simple configuration directive to ntp.conf was
added. In practice, this became available to ordinary ntpd users
with the 4.2.6 release of ntpd at the end of 2009. Servers with
a manually configured leap second file will ignore other leap
second advertisements until the leap second file expires.
A. Response Data
Over the period, over 19 million responses to queries were
recorded. A summary of the types of information recorded in
the responses is shown in Fig. 1. For each month over the
collection period, we show the number of requests made and
the different information types returned. The graph shows that
from December 2008 until September 2012 the information
available consists of the leap flags and NTP status bits.
_reqtype is a meta-response, indicating whether the request
was made using ntpq or ntpdate. A small number of other
variables are reported in this period, apparently by unusual
NTP implementations that report hostname, processor and
version strings even though they are not requested. The update
to the list of queried hosts in April 2012 is also apparent in
both the number of queries and responses. There is also a
slight change to the way some of the data is reported from
March 2009 due to an upgrade of the ntp tools used.
Starting in June 2013, we see a wider range of types of
data being reported, reflecting queries requesting the default
variable list. There are several different groups of variables
corresponding to the default variable lists in various NTP
implementations, and also manual configuration changes made
by individual administrators. There is also a reduction in the
overall number of requests, corresponding to unresponsive
servers being pruned.
Between reconfigurations, we see a gradual decline in the
number of responses, for example, from November 2008 until
March 2012, there is a decline of, on average, 2.9 servers
that respond per month, or a reduction of 1% per month
in the responding population. The other periods of stable
configuration up to December 2014 also show a reduction of
about 1% per month in the responding population.
Beginning in December 2014 we see a sharp decline in
4the number of responses to rv queries: 10–40% per month.
This reduction corresponds closely to the disclosure of the
ntpd monlist DoS attack and levels out by about June 2014.
While this reduction is sharp, it is not quite as dramatic as the
92% reduction over three months in the number of amplifiers
reported in [13]. The sharper reduction in the number of
amplifiers may be due to some administrators disabling the
monlist feature to prevent the attack, rather than blocking all
ntpq queries. Our consequent introduction of our ntpdate
queries begins in January 2014. A significant number of new
hosts provide responses to the ntpdate request, and also
provide values for attributes relating to time synchronisation
queries, such as delay, dispersion and various timestamps.
B. Leap Second Indicator Flags
Two bits are used in NTP packets to indicate information
about upcoming leap seconds. A value of 00 indicates that no
leap second is pending, a value of 01 means a leap second
is to be inserted, a value of 10 means a leap second is to
be removed and 11 indicates that the leap status is unknown
because the clock is unsynchronised. Though RFC 1059, 1305
and 4330 state that these flags indicate a leap at the end of the
current day, in practice NTP has known that the leap second
can only occur at the end of the month and has processed the
flag accordingly. In recognition of this, RFC 5905 now states
that these flags indicate a leap second in the last minute of
current month.
1) Behaviour at Scheduled Leap Seconds: The top left of
Fig. 2 shows the leap indicator behaviour of the monitored
servers for the preliminary measurement in 2005 for several
days around the leap second. The point of the leap second is
marked with a vertical line. We plot the fraction of servers in
our stratum 1 and stratum 2 servers showing leap values of
01, 10 or 11.
We can see that more than 24 hours before the leap second,
< 10% of stratum 1 and < 20% of stratum 2 servers know
about the pending leap. The situation improves considerably
in the day before, with a peak in the hour directly before the
leap. These increases are likely to be due to reference clocks
that provide notification of the leap either one day or one
hour before the leap second. Curiously, one stratum 2 server
advertises the removal of a leap second in the hour before
the leap. After the leap, 10–20% of hosts fail to clear their
leap indicators, but this number gradually dwindles over the
following days.
Interestingly, there is also an increase in unsynchronised
stratum 1 servers after the leap second. One might expect that
these servers did not know about the leap second, and became
unsynchronised on finding that they were one second ahead of
other servers. However, looking at the individual servers in-
volved, it appears that these servers knew about the upcoming
leap second. We speculate that the problem may have been an
interaction between the leap second implementation in ntpd
and that of the attached reference clock.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show show similar graphs around the
time of potential leap seconds in the main data set (i.e. the
end of each June and December), except for 2010 and 2011,
which show similar behaviour to 2009. Results are shown for
three days on either side of the end of the month. First, note
that other than a smattering of servers in December 2008 and
January 2009, we see no indicators for removal of a leap
second.
As expected, only three graphs show substantial activity in
the leap indicator flags, corresponding to the actual leap sec-
onds. However, there is some evidence of unusual behaviour
in the 24 hours before the end of 2012, 2013 and 2014. First,
let us consider the behaviour around each of the three leap
seconds, which we note is quite different.
In 2008, we see that even three days before the leap second
is scheduled, already 20–30% of servers are advertising the
forthcoming leap, with the percentage rising 2 days and 1 day
before the leap second (up to 50–80%), and peaking the hour
before the leap. We note that this is a marginal improvement
compared to 2005, particularly more than 24 hours before. The
proportion of stratum 2 and pool servers advertising the leap
is higher than the proportion of stratum 1 servers, which is
consistent with 2005. We also see a small number of servers
becoming unsynchronised around the leap, about half of which
share operators with those that became unsynchronised in
2005, indicating possible shared reference clock issues.
Again, a significant fraction of servers continue to advertise
the leap second, in fact a larger proportion than in 2005. Most
stratum 1 servers have stopped advertising the leap by mid-
January, stratum 2 by mid-April and the pool before the end of
June! A bug was identified that, in particular circumstances, re-
sulted in the leap second information not being fully cleared5.
Examining the source repository, it appears that this bug may
have been introduced in overhauls of the leap second handling
code in 2007, allowing leap flags to persist through a reference
counting problem.
In 2012, a slightly different pattern is observed. Again,
three days before the leap second there are already a number
of servers advertising an upcoming leap, though a lower
proportion (< 20%) than seen in 2008. This time, there is
no increase 48 hours before the leap, but there is a sharp
increase 24 hours before the leap (to around 60–80%), again
with a peak 1 hour before the leap, improving upon 2005
and 2008. This is consistent with what we expect based on
the gradual adoption of majority-vote (beginning 2007), easy
manual configuration of the leap second file (beginning 2007–
2009) and a change in 2008 that limits the advertisement of a
leap second to one day before the leap.
As in 2008, some servers continue to advertise the leap
after it has occurred, though a lower proportion than in 2008.
Many servers return to normal at the end of July, resulting
in some discussion on mailing lists6. This is, presumably, the
continued presence of the bug from 2007, which is resolved
later in 2012.
A number of servers are unsynchronised in the period
around the leap. Manually examining the logs for each of
these, it seems some are simply servers that were unsyn-
chronised for reasons apparently unrelated to the leap second
5https://bugs.ntp.org/show bug.cgi?id=2246
6E.g. http://lists.ntp.org/pipermail/questions/2012-August/033611.html
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Fig. 2. Hourly behaviour of leap second flags around end of December 2005, December 2008, June 2009 and December 2009.
(e.g. becoming unsynchronised hours before the leap was
scheduled, with no evidence of having stepped their clock),
while a few appear to become unsynchronised at the leap
because they were not aware that it was pending.
By June 2015, many NTP operators will have upgraded
their ntpd to versions from early 2015 because of the DoS
amplification attack. Now, almost no servers advertise the
pending leap second until 24 hours before it is due. Then
60–80% of servers begin to advertise the leap second, again
with a peak one hour before the leap. Behaviour after the
leap second is considerably better in 2015, with the fraction
of servers advertising the leap falling below 10% within an
hour of the leap. This may either be due to deployed copies
of the leap second file, which would reject leap seconds, or
a change made in late 2013, which suppresses leap second
advertisement during the first hour of each month.
In addition, a small number of servers in all groups become
unsynchronised just after the leap second. The more detailed
information available from both ntpdate and the default
variable list let us say more about what happened to these
servers. We see the following behaviours: (1) Many of these
didn’t know the leap second was scheduled, and we observe
their clock is 1s ahead, and is subsequently stepped. (2) A
number of these use GPS or PPS reference clocks, which
usually have no way to indicate a forthcoming leap second. (3)
A small number of servers seem to leap correctly, but then later
step the clock, presumably due to an upstream peer that missed
the leap second. (4) Some servers using the ACTS reference
clock seem to have known about the upcoming leap second,
but not implemented it, as timestamps are out by 1s after the
leap second. This final behaviour matches that observed in
2005 and 2008.
2) Behaviour at Potential Leap Seconds: As noted above,
there are also 12 days when a leap second could have
potentially been scheduled, but was not. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3
also include graphs showing the behaviour around a subset.
In June 2009, June 2010, December 2010 and June 2011,
we see no leap second being advertised. In December 2009
and December 2011 we see small anomalies where, after the
potential leap, a server briefly advertises the insertion of a leap
second, but stops shortly afterwards.
In December 2015, there is also an anomaly: one Stratum 2
server has been advertising an upcoming leap since late June.
This server is running a version of ntpd with the bug that
results in flags not always being cleared, which seems a likely
cause for this anomaly.
In each of December 2012, June 2013, December 2013,
June 2014 and December 2014, close inspection of the graphs
shows that there is a small increase in servers advertising an
upcoming leap second in the 24 hours before the potential
leap. These servers seem to appear in clusters. For example, in
December 2012 a group of .edu servers and a group of .ru
servers account for the majority of the aberrant advertisements.
Slight variations of these groups reappear: the .edu group
in June 2013 and June 2014; the .ru group in December
2013 and December 2014. Combined with a .net cluster in
June 2014, these groups seem to explain almost all of the
unexpected advertisements of leap seconds.
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Fig. 3. Hourly behaviour of leap second flags around end of June/December 2012–2015. Graphs are chronologically ordered from top left to bottom right.
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Fig. 4. Fraction of servers responding to ntpq queries reporting variables
indicating the presence of a leap second file.
The clustering of these servers suggests that localised prop-
agation of a bogus leap second is possible, but it does not
become widespread. In the case of the .edu group, it appears
that an old version of ntpd running on a stratum 1 server with
an unusual reference clock may be a common factor. Overall,
we see only localised advertisments of leap seconds at times
when none are scheduled.
C. Presence of the Leap Seconds File
It is possible to gain some insight into the increased
availability of the leap second file using the servers responding
to ntpq queries. The presence of the leap second file results
in two ntpd management variables being set. One, tai,
gives the current difference between the atomic timescale and
UTC. The other, leapsec, gives a timestamp associated with
the generation of the leap second file (if this timestamp is
available). For some ntpd versions, tai could be reported as
0 if no leap second file was present.
Fig. 4 shows the fraction of servers responding to ntpq
queries that provide leapsec or tai values. We see that the
total number of servers reporting a positive tai value or a leap
second file timestamp are quite close, ranging from around
10% in mid-2013 to almost 25% by 2016. While this suggests
that there has been an increase in the number of servers using
leap second files, it is possible that the server administrators
who configure the leap second file are correlated with those
who continue to permit ntpq queries.
We also show a breakdown of the tai values reported.
This shows that there are a number of NTP servers with an
off-by-one error in their calculation of tai. We can also see
the majority of servers going from advertising a tai value of
35 to 36 around the June 2015 leap second, as expected.
If we consider the groups of servers identified above that
advertised a bogus leap second, we find that none of them had
a leap second file configured when the problem happened. It
appears that several operators subsequently configured the file
and did not appear in errant groups thereafter.
V. POST-HOC ANALYSIS OF LEAP EVENTS
Suppose we measure some subset of the leap second graph
at the time of a leap second, noting which nodes insert a leap
second, and which do not. How would we diagnose which
servers advertised the incorrect leap second flags after the
fact, if they are not in our observed set of nodes? Such an
analysis might be useful to an administrator to determine
which external NTP servers provided incorrect information
after a missed leap.
Let Xi be 1 if server i is advertising a leap second and
be 0 otherwise. We observe Xi = xi for some observed
subset W of the servers. Since the client-server relationships
are persistent7, we can also determine the set Si of servers
used by server i. We then wish to determine the Xi for the
unobserved nodes. Remember that modern versions of ntpd
use majority vote to determine if a leap second flag will be
heeded8, which amounts to finding Xi so that:
Xi = xi ∀i ∈W,
Xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i 6∈W,
1
|Si|
∑
j∈Si
Xj > 0.5 if i ∈W and Xi = 1,
1
|Si|
∑
j∈Si
Xj ≤ 0.5 if i ∈W and Xi = 0,
We could regard this as a constraint satisfaction problem,
which will typically have multiple solutions, each solution
indicating a configuration of leap second flags that could have
lead to the observed conditions. By assigning probabilities to
the correct/incorrect advertisement of the unobserved servers,
we can sum over the solutions to calculate a probability of
incorrect advertisement for the unobserved servers. Alterna-
tively, based on our observations that most servers correctly
advertise the leap second most of the time, then we can find
the solution which maximises/minimises:∑
i 6∈W
Xi,
according to whether we expect there to be a leap second
advertised at the time.
To test this method, we considered a real-life example of
a cluster of 69 nodes that had each been configured to use
4 pool servers. Thus, each node had effectively configured 4
servers from a larger group of external NTP servers. In total,
53 distinct external servers were in use. In the cluster, 60 nodes
correctly inserted the 2015 leap second and 9 did not. After
the event, the external servers being used by each node in the
cluster were identified using the ntpq -p command.
Clearly, evaluating all 253 possibilities of external servers
inserting a leap second or not to find which are consistent with
the behaviour of the observed cluster nodes is an impractical
debugging technique. We know from Section IV that the frac-
tion of pool servers that correctly advertise the leap is bigger
7In many circumstances, they can be recovered from ntpq -p and/or from
ntp.conf after the fact.
8We could replace some constraints if we knew older versions were running
on some servers.
8than 0.5, so we construct a binary optimisation programme
to minimise the sum of the Xi. Using the SCIP Optimization
Suite, a solution was found in 0.1s on an ordinary desktop PC,
identifying a minimal set of 5 possible servers.
VI. DISCUSSION
In Section IV we saw that while the leap second behaviour
of the NTP network is not ideal, the majority of NTP servers
discover that there is a leap second pending before the leap
second is due. We observed servers that missed the leap
becoming unsynchronised when the extra second was inserted,
and subsequently stepping their clocks. We expect similar
behaviour from any NTP client that missed the leap second.
The alternative misbehaviour of inserting a bogus leap second
appears rare and localised to particular subsets of servers. This
suggests that NTP’s majority-vote mechanism for propagating
leap second information should be effective in providing the
correct information when a diverse subset of upstream servers
is used.
The level of good behaviour seems to be increasing, pos-
sibly driven by features in ntpd improving the propagation of
leap seconds in the NTP network and allowing administrators
to manually configure a file describing past and future leap
seconds. Indeed, it may be worth including a leap second file
as a part the standard ntpd configuration9. Keeping this file up
to date represents a minor logistic challenge, however these
files are issued with an expiry date, and so are not harmful
when they become stale (in contrast to, say, routing bogon
files).
While we have focused on the correct implementation of
leap seconds in the NTP network, even when NTP has correct
knowledge of leap seconds there is scope for issues. On
POSIX systems, the leap second is commonly implemented
by replaying the last second of the relevant minute. Thus the
clock appears to step backwards, which may cause problems
for some systems. For example, after the 2005 and 2008 leap
seconds, Google reported that the leap second had caused
some internal issues and that they would internally smear in
the leap second using a windowed cosine10. In practice, it
appears that Google used a linear smear to interpolate the leap
second11 in 2015.
Another issue that arose from the the insertion of the leap
second was the Linux kernel printing a message to say that
the leap second had been handled, however in some kernel
versions this was at a point in the kernel where printing might
lead to a deadlock. This led to a number of Linux machines
hanging during the 2008, 2012 and 2015 leap seconds12. An
issue with a later version of Linux futexes resulted in some
applications busy-waiting rather than sleeping13.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we summarise the leap second behaviour of a
group of servers providing a public NTP service from 2005
9This is being trialed in recent versions of FreeBSD.
10https://googleblog.blogspot.ie/2011/09/time-technology-and-leaping-seconds.
html
11https://mlichvar.fedorapeople.org/leap2015/google smear.png
12https://lkml.org/lkml/2009/1/2/373
13https://access.redhat.com/articles/15145
to 2015. The behaviour in each of the four leap seconds
during this period is different and seems to show progressive
improvement. We also consider the advertisement of bogus
leap seconds and see that it is possible, but rare, and originates
from small groups of servers. We also look at the deployment
of the leap second file, and see it has grown over the period.
Finally, we propose a technique for post-hoc diagnosis of
incorrect leap seconds.
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